Lack of Domestic Violence History Does Not Preclude Victim’s Need for Protection
Jun 4, 2026 | Written by: | Share
As discussed in prior blogs on this site about domestic violence, the Silver case requires a court to determine that 1) there has been a predicate act of domestic violence committed; AND 2) a final restraining order is needed to protect the victim from immediate danger or to prevent further abuse[1]. In other words, the second inquiry under the Silver analytical paradigm "is whether the court should enter a restraining order that provides protection for the victim."
What happens in the instance of acquaintance rape? What happens where there is a clear predicate of domestic violence – egregious physical force, but no prior history to fulfill the second prong of Silver?
In the recently published NJ Appellate Division case of G.G.S. v. A.C.B., the court answered these questions.
At the conclusion of the hearing at the trial court level, the judge denied the Final Restraining Order (FRO), despite finding that the sexual assault occurred and that the defendant manually strangled the plaintiff. The trial court appropriately described the event as “despicable” and found the plaintiff’s testimony “legitimate.” However, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not established the grounds for an FRO because she did not prove it was necessary to protect her from immediate danger, relying on the lack of previous history of domestic violence between the parties, who had only known each other for one week prior to the horrific events.
The plaintiff appealed and the Appellate Division immediately reversed and remanded for the entry of the FRO, finding these “disturbing facts run afoul of the letter and spirit of the PDVA (Prevention of Domestic Violence Act).”
This important case addresses the immediacy issue.
Notably, the plaintiff told the court that she and the defendant would be attending the same college the following fall, and she was very concerned she would run into him. She also expressed concern that the defendant would come to her workplace. Eerily, the defendant also worked as a trainer, so the plaintiff could not attend her remaining softball games because he would be present.
Although a plaintiff seeking an FRO must establish the need for protection from further abuse, the foreseeable abuse need not be imminent and the risk of it coming to fruition should be assessed in the context of considering the victim’s best interests.
“As we explain, we believe that as a general proposition, to ensure proportionality in effectuating the protective goals of the PDVA, the greater the level of violence that is proven, the easier it is for a plaintiff to satisfy the second prong of the Silver analytical paradigm. Indeed, that is exactly what the perfunctory-and-self-evident principle accomplishes.”
“The recognition that a single "sufficiently egregious action" can suffice to grant an FRO is an important feature of our domestic violence jurisprudence—one designed to ensure that victims of physical violence receive the maximum protection the PDVA can provide. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 18. In A.M.C. v. P.B., we applied this precept, explaining that "[w]hen the predicate act is an offense that inherently involves the use of physical force and violence, the decision to issue an FRO 'is most often perfunctory and self-evident.'" 447 N.J. Super. 402, 417 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Silver, 387 N.J. A-3315-24 26 Super. at 127). See also S.K. v. J.H., 426 N.J. Super. 230, 233 (App. Div. 2012) (commenting that an attack that left the victim with severe bruises, fractures in her orbital bone and jaw, cuts requiring stitches, and a lung injury was "a predicate act of such severity and viciousness that the need for a restraining order . . . was 'perfunctory and self-evident'" (quoting Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127)). The "one sufficiently egregious action" principle helps to ensure a proportionate response to each domestic violence situation, recognizing that the same basic remedy—an FRO with all of its potentially "severe" consequences, C.R. II, 257 N.J. at 144—applies to a wide spectrum of unlawful conduct, ranging from petty disorderly persons offenses to first degree crimes.”
Here, the Appellate Division found that the absence of a prior history of domestic violence had little bearing on the plaintiff’s need for protection, and noted that the fact that forcible rape occurred so early in their relationship did NOT mitigate the need for a no contact order, especially where there were reasons to believe future encounters would likely occur.
The important takeaway from this decision is that in a case like this, there is no need for any benchmark (prior domestic violence) from which to predict escalation, because the predicate act already involved physical and sexual violence.
[1] Silver v. Silver (387 N.J. Super. 112)
Diana N. Fredericks, Esq., devotes her practice solely to family law matters. She is a Certified Matrimonial Law Attorney and was named to the NJ Super Lawyers Rising Stars list in the practice of family law by Thomson Reuters from 2015 through 2021, to the NJ Super Lawyers list in 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026, and to the New Leaders of the Bar list by the New Jersey Law Journal in 2015. Contact Diana for a consultation at 908-735-5161 or via email.
If you have a suggestion for a future blog topic, please feel free to submit it via the Contact Us form.
Any statements made herein are solely for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon or construed as legal advice.