Three Recent Updates in Family Law
Dec 8, 2025 | Written by: | Share
Each day our attorneys receive a list of daily decisions, notifying us of decisions made from the Trial Court to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Being up to date with new case law is critically important to every area of practice. While some decisions are unpublished and therefore not precedent, they can still be very useful and instructive. Published decisions are binding and create new precedent. Good attorneys read these daily reports (in their entirety) each day to keep abreast of changes in the law, and to best aid their clients. Following are three recent family law-related decisions that warrant attention and discussion.
1. A.C. v. R.S.
Notably, this Appellate Division decision is published.
“Defendant appealed a final protective order issued in favor of plaintiff under the Victim's Assistance and Survivor Protection Act. Plaintiff alleged that defendant engaged in stalking and cyber-harassment following an incident outside plaintiff's home, which she shares with her children. Plaintiff had entered a romantic relationship with defendant's husband. Defendant appeared at plaintiff's residence, causing a disturbance and later sent a series of text messages to plaintiff, which included threats to contact plaintiff's employer and lewd comments. The trial court found that while plaintiff did not prove stalking, she did establish cyber-harassment based on the texts sent by defendant, which were deemed to have no purpose other than to annoy or alarm plaintiff. The court concluded that the texts, sent at 2:00 a.m., demonstrated an intent to harass, especially since defendant remained at the scene after police intervention. On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the text messages did not meet the statutory definition of cyber-harassment under VASPA. The court determined that the texts did not threaten physical harm or constitute lewdness as defined by the statute, which required exposure of genitals. Additionally, the court clarified that text messages could be considered online communications under VASPA but found that defendant's statements about contacting plaintiff's employer did not constitute a threat of harm to plaintiff's property, as defendant intended to inform plaintiff's employers about plaintiff's relationship with defendant's husband. The court reversed the FPO, concluding that the plaintiff did not establish a predicate act under VASPA.”
The important point taken from this decision is the application of text messages in future proceedings, as the Appellate Division clearly opined that text messages may be considered online communications. While not applicable for the order of protection in this specific case, this is important guidance for practitioners going forward, particularly as the use of text messages are prevalent throughout family law litigation.
2. Z.M v. K.M.
It is important to note that this is an unpublished decision.
“Plaintiff appealed several post-judgment rulings by the trial court regarding reimbursement of expenses related to the parties' children. The parties, who divorced in 2017, had two minor children and agreed in their Marital Settlement Agreement to equally share costs for the children's health insurance and PSAT tutoring. Plaintiff sought reimbursement for summer camp expenses, health insurance premiums, and PSAT tutoring costs. The trial court granted plaintiff reimbursement for summer camp expenses but offset this with his share of health insurance premiums and PSAT tutoring costs. The trial court ordered plaintiff to pay half of the health insurance premiums for the months he was aware of the actual costs, resulting in a $1,488 offset. Regarding PSAT tutoring costs, the trial court reduced plaintiff's share to $520, based on an average of the tutor's rate and a commercial rate. However, the trial court improperly took judicial notice of the commercial rate without allowing objections. Plaintiff argued against the offsets, citing equitable principles, but the trial court found that such doctrines do not relieve parents of their obligations to support their children. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of a previous order on therapy costs, as it was untimely, and declined to shift counsel fees, citing the parties' financial situations. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's decisions in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part, without retaining jurisdiction. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the tutoring costs, allowing parties to present evidence of market rates.”
This case is instructive in that the remand (return to the trial court) specifies that the court should allow each party to present evidence of market rates on the issue of tutoring costs and reimbursements. While this may seem very niche, reimbursements of child-related expenses are a very common post-divorce topic (which is why settlement agreements need to be extremely specific). This case underscores the discretion of the court to consider child-related expenses and provides some instructions to litigants and practitioners as to what should be considered, how, why, etc.
Interestingly, in this case, the tutoring was provided by the mother’s former boyfriend, who billed his time on an hourly basis. The father claimed he thought the tutoring was being provided free of charge. Texts between the father and mother placed into evidence reflect he did not approve of this particular tutor. The mother sought the father to pay $2,450 for his share of the tutoring bills. The judge reduced that allocated share significantly to $520.
This writer notes, respectfully, the waste of time and judicial resources of filing an appeal over an approximately $1,900 issue, which is likely why the father was self-represented and the mother did not respond to the appeal.
This is an unpublished decision.
“Defendant appealed orders that allowed plaintiff to apply for and receive counsel fees and costs. The parties divorced in 2008 and shared custody of their son. Following son's relocation to California in 2023 to live with plaintiff, the parties attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate a consent order to modify their marital settlement agreement concerning custody and child support. Plaintiff continued to pay child support during negotiations, and defendant initially reimbursed him but stopped after April 2023. Plaintiff moved to terminate his child support obligation and sought reimbursement for overpayments and to recover counsel fees and costs and for defendant to pay child support. Family Part judge granted plaintiff's motion in its entirety, finding defendant's retention of child support payments unreasonable since son no longer resided with her. Trial judge directed plaintiff's counsel to submit an updated certification of legal services. Defendant objected, arguing the delay in reimbursing plaintiff was due to the lack of a mutually agreed consent order and the statutory prohibition on retroactive child support modification. Family Part judge awarded fees. Defendant contended trial judge erred by not applying the required factors under Rule 5:3-5(c) and by equating a legal dispute with litigation misconduct. Court found the Family Part judge's omission of the Rule 5:3-5(c) analysis necessitated a remand to reconsider the fee award.”
Rule 5:3-5(c) sets forth the factors to be analyzed in deciding whether to award attorney's fees. The factors require the judge to consider the following: (1) the financial circumstances of the parties; (2) the ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to contribute to the fees of the other party; (3) the reasonableness and good faith of the positions advanced by the parties both during and prior to trial; (4) the extent of the fees incurred by both parties; (5) any fees previously awarded; (6) the amount of fees previously paid to counsel by each party; (7) the results obtained; (8) the degree to which fees were incurred to enforce existing orders or to compel discovery; and (9) any other factor bearing on the fairness of an award.
The Appellate Division held that because the court failed to address the above-mentioned factors, the counsel fee request could not be upheld and was returned (remanded) to the trial court. That does not mean that the lower court cannot issue the exact same decision and result, but simply that the reasons have to be set forth and the factors addressed. Given that this should be remanded to the judge who originally decided the issue, it is hard to believe the court will change its mind. Rather, the court might simply supplement its decision, again resulting in a lot more legal fees for the same outcome. This is to be determined...
Diana N. Fredericks, Esq., devotes her practice solely to family law matters. She is a Certified Matrimonial Law Attorney and was named to the NJ Super Lawyers Rising Stars list in the practice of family law by Thomson Reuters from 2015 through 2021, to the NJ Super Lawyers list in 2023, 2024, and 2025, and to the New Leaders of the Bar list by the New Jersey Law Journal in 2015. Contact Diana for a consultation at 908-735-5161 or via email.
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Any statements made herein are solely for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon or construed as legal advice.