Recent Updates in Family Law: Domestic Violence

Jun 18, 2025 | Written by: Diana N. Fredericks, Esq. | Share

Every day, the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) publishes the daily decisions from the court on all areas/topics of law.  The daily decisions are often on unreported decisions from the Appellate Division, and, while they are not necessarily binding precedent, they can often be instructive and useful.  A significant percentage of the cases recently decided involve the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA).  That docket is often one of the busiest, making it critically important for your attorney to be familiar with these updates when representing you in a domestic violence matter.

Here are four recent updates from the Appellate Division involving domestic violence:

1. C.O.T. v. M.K.W. – after a trial was conducted and a Final Restraining Order (FRO) entered, the defendant filed an appeal, which was granted and the FRO was reversed and remanded for a new trial. This appeal was successful based on procedural flaws.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the judge incorrectly advised him about the use of his testimony in a criminal action, which resulted in his declining to testify about an incident alleged to be a prior act of domestic violence.  He asserted that the judge erred by not advising him of his right to cross-examine the plaintiff, and that the finding of harassment and entry of the FRO was not supported in the record. The Appellate Division agreed with the defendant that the judge made several missteps by incorrectly advising him about testimonial immunity in domestic violence proceedings and not affording him the opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff. These procedural errors required reversal. 
   1. The PDVA "grants a limited immunity for testimony provided at FRO hearings in a related criminal case." M.A. v. J.H.M. The statute provides:  If a criminal complaint arising out of the same incident which is the subject matter of a complaint brought under [the PDVA] has been filed, testimony given by the plaintiff or defendant in the domestic violence matter shall not be used in the simultaneous or subsequent criminal proceeding against the defendant, other than domestic violence contempt matters and where it would otherwise be admissible hearsay under the rules of evidence that govern where a party is unavailable. 

2. R.M.L. v. D.R.B. - R.M.L. and D.R.B. were domestic partners for approximately fourteen years before they broke up. They recoupled another fourteen years later, residing together at D.R.B.'s apartment in West Orange, New Jersey for approximately two and a half years prior to the entry of the FROs. D.R.B. became so angry that R.M.L. could not drive her to Queens, New York due to her injury, that she hit R.M.L.'s knee with her cane.  In September 2023, D.R.B. attempted to stab R.M.L. with a knife, ultimately only "cutting [R.M.L.'s] finger," and bruising R.M.L.'s breast.  D.R.B. appealed the entry of the FRO against her.  Assault is one of the predicate acts included in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a).   A person is guilty of assault if the person, "[a]ttempts to cause or purposely, knowingly[,] or recklessly causes bodily injury to another . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1). 'Bodily injury' is defined as 'physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition.’” State ex rel. S.B., 333 N.J. Super. 236, 242 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a)). "Even the slightest physical contact, if done intentionally, is considered a simple assault under New Jersey law." N.B. v. T.B., 297 N.J. Super. 35, 43 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting State v. Bazin, 912 F. Supp. 106, 115 (D.N.J. 1995)).  The record established a need for the FRO against D.R.B. because the parties had "a pattern of abusive and controlling behavior" spanning nearly thirty years. See N.G., 426 N.J. Super. at 409.  The Appellate Court therefore conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that D.R.B. poses "future danger or threats of violence [to R.M.L.]" warranting the entry of the FRO. See D.M.R., 467 N.J. Super. at 322. 

3. H.D. v. V.P. – important takeaways from this case:
   1. "An order is interlocutory, and not final, if it does not dispose of counsel fees issues."   The July 27, 2023 FRO was, therefore, interlocutory. The forty-five-day period in which to file an appeal began with the entry of the October 27, 2023 order awarding plaintiff attorney's fees. See R. 2:4-1(a). Defendant's November 10, 2023 notice of appeal was timely filed.
   2. For a finding of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, the actor must have the purpose to harass. Finding a party had the purpose to harass must be supported by "some evidence that the actor's conscious object was to alarm or annoy; mere awareness that someone might be alarmed or annoyed is insufficient.  A purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence.  Common sense and experience may also inform a determination or finding of purpose. [T]he decision about whether a particular series of events rises to the level of harassment or not is fact-sensitive.”
   3. As compensation for a victim of domestic violence, a trial court may award reasonable attorney's fees. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4). A counsel fee award is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and is disturbed only on the rarest occasions. Gnall v. Gnall, 432 N.J. Super. 129, 165 (App. Div. 2013). "[D]eterminations by trial courts [regarding legal fees] will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." McGowan v. O'Rourke, 391 N.J. Super. 502, 508 (App. Div. 2007). 

4. L.E.O. v. A.S. - The parties had a long-term marriage and had been divorced for nearly seven years when the plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO). The plaintiff's domestic violence complaint alleged that the defendant committed harassment on April 1, 19, and 20, 2024, and asserted an eight-year history of stalking and harassment.  Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, a person commits harassment if, "with purpose to harass another," they: "(a) Make[], or cause[] to be made, one or more communications . . . [in] any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; . . . or (c) [e]ngage[] in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person."  A purpose to harass must be supported by "some evidence that the actor's conscious object was to alarm or annoy; mere awareness that someone might be alarmed or annoyed is insufficient." J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 487 (2011) (citing State v. Fuchs, 230 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App. Div. 1989)).  A court does "not measure the effect of the speech upon the victim; [it] look[s] to the purpose of the actor in making the communication."  Common sense and experience may also inform the determination or finding of purpose.  At its core, the [PDVA] effectuates the notion that the victim of domestic violence is entitled to be left alone.  To be left alone is, in essence, the basic protection the law seeks to assure these victims. The PDVA was intended "to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.” 

Diana N. Fredericks, Esq., devotes her practice solely to family law matters.  She is a Certified Matrimonial Law Attorney and was named to the NJ Super Lawyers Rising Stars list in the practice of family law by Thomson Reuters from 2015 through 2021, to the NJ Super Lawyers list in 2023, 2024, and 2025, and to the New Leaders of the Bar list by the New Jersey Law Journal in 2015.  Contact Ms. Fredericks for a consultation at 908-735-5161 or via email.

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Any statements made herein are solely for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon or construed as legal advice.